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nature of the transaction whereby Atha acquired her interest 
from Mark or the amounts of the various mortgages and 
payments involved. There is thus no evidence which would 
warrant the appellate court in making additional findings 
for the purpose of affirming the judgment for Atha in part. 
Because the evidence is insufficient to warrant a recovery 
by Atha upon any of the legal grounds advanced by the 
parties upon trial or appeal, or even upon the new theory 
which is the basis of the decision, I would reverse the judg-
ment. 
[L. A. No. 21947. In Bank. Oct. 101 1952.] 
LAWRENCE BARKER, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. WALTER M. BRIGGS, Appellant. 
[1] Limitation of Actions-Instruments in Writing.-Lessee's 
- claim for damages based on lessor's failure to maintain a party 
wall in safe condition as required by terms of lease is governed 
by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause 
of action founded on a written instrument. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 337.) 
[2] Landlord and Tenant-Unlawful Detainer.-A lessor's action 
to recover possession of real property is not one for unlawful 
detainer where plaintiff does not comply with the statutory 
notice requirements for such detainer. (See Civ. Code, § 793; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1159 et seq.) 
[3] Set-o:ff and Counterclaim-Requisites and Subject Matter.-
Although lessor suing in ejectment to recover possession of 
real property Beeks no money damages other than attorney's 
fees as provided in the lease, such fees constitute a sufficient 
prayer for damages to entitle defendant to counterclaim for 
damages suffered by him because of plaintiff's alleged breach 
of provisions of the lease pertaining to maintenance of a party 
wall. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 59; Am.Jur., Limita-
tion of Actions, § 79 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Set-off and Counterclaim, § 13; Am.Jur., Set-off 
and Counterclaim, § 24 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Limitation of Actions, § 32; [2] . 
Landlord and Tenant, § 277; [3] Set-off and Counterclaim, § 19; 
[4] Judgments, § 14; [5] Landlord and Tenant, § 197. 
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[4] Judgments- Declaratory Judgments- Refusal of Relief.-
Where parking lot lease provides for minimum monthly rental 
plus a percentage of the gross receipts in excess of a certain 
sum based on gross income "derived in any manner, directly 
or indirectly, from or by the use or occupancy'' of such prem-
ises, and the quoted words can be construed either in accord-
ance with the lessor's theory that it is entitled to the entire 
revenue or in accordance with the lessee's theory that he is 
only to account for a percentage of the revenue for cars 
entering that lot but actually parked on another lot located 
on adjacent premises which he had leased from another lessor, 
such lessee states a cause of action for declaratory relief and 
the trial court errs in finding that "there is no occasion to 
enter any declaratory judgment." 
[5] Landlord and Tenant-Termination of Lea.se-l'orfeiture.-A 
forfeiture of a lease did not result from the lessor's reentry 
and repossession of the leased premises on the lessee's alleged 
default; and where the lease specifically provided that lessor 
could hold or sell the securities deposited with it, on lessee's 
default, either during or at the end of the term of the lease, 
retention of the deposit did not constitute a forfeiture, espe-
cially where lessee did not request that the sum retained by 
lessor be returned to him . 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover possession of real property. Judgment for 
plaintiff reversed. 
Benjamin J. Goodman and Krystal & Paradise for Appel-
lant. 
Kenyon F. Lee, Thomas D. Mercola, Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher and Sherman Welpton, Jr., for Respondent. 
Richard Culbert Olson, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, Lawrence Barker, Inc., recovered 
judgment entitling it to immediate possession of certain real 
property leased by it to defendant, Walter M. Briggs. The 
judgment provided that defendant was not entitled to take 
anything by reason of his counterclaim and that he was not 
entitled to a declaratory judgment by reason of his cross-
complaint. Plaintiff recovered costs and attorney's fees . 
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The lease involved in the controversy was entered into on 
January 1, 1945, for a 10-year term by Lawrence Barker, 
Inc., as lessor, and Walter M.· Briggs, as lessee. The lease 
covered premises consisting of one lot located on Spring 
Street in the city of Los Angeles, which was to be used by 
the lessee as a parking lot. Pursuant to the lease, Briggs 
entered into possession and operated thereon an automobile 
parking lot or station. Subsequent to the execution of this 
lease, defendant Briggs, who operated approximately 70 other 
s11ch lots in the vicinity of Los Angeles, entered into another 
parking lot lease with another lessor. This subsequent lease 
covered premises located on Main Street adjacent to the prem-
ises in question but separated by a 20-foot public alley. The 
premises in question will hereinafter be referred to as the 
Spring Street lot and the Main Street lot. The provisions 
of the lease involved here are as follows: 
''SECOND : The Lessee covenants and agrees to pay to the 
Lessor as a monthly rental for the demised premises the sum 
of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty ($1,250.00) Dollars 
per month, payable in advance upon the 1st day of each 
month of said term. In. addition to the monthly rental pay-
ments, Lessee covenants and agrees annually to pay to the 
Lessor the amount, if any, by which sixty (60%) per cent 
of the gross income or receipts of the Lessee, derived in any 
manner, directly or ind1:rectly, from or by the use or occupancy 
of said demised premises ill any one calendar year, exceeds 
the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars. Lessee 
agrees annually to furnish to Lessor a report or statement, 
prepared and certified by a reputable Certified Public Ac-
countant, showing said gross income or receipts of Lessee from 
said demised premises, as aforesaid, during the preceding 
calendar year, paying at the same time any such additional 
rent shown by said report or statement to be due the Lessor 
from the Lessee. Said report or statement shall be furnished, 
and said payment of additional rent, if any be due, shall 
be made, within a reasonable time after the close of each 
calendar year of the term of this lease, and in no event later 
than sixty (60) days after said close of said calendar year. 
The expense of said report or statement shall be borne by 
the Lessee.'' 
''THIRD : The Lessee has deposited with Lessor concurrently 
with the execution of this Lease certain stocks and securities. 
. . . Said stocks and securities . . . are deposited for the 
purpose of, and shall be held as, security to the Lessor for 
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the performance by the Lessee of all the terms, agreements, 
covenants and conditions of this lease. . . . Title to said 
stocks and securities, originally constituting said 'deposit', 
has been transferred or shall be transferred to the name of 
Lessor, and Lessor may continue to hold said 'deposit' in 
its own name. . . . In the event that Lessee, shall be in de-
fault under any of the terms, agreements, covenants, or con-
ditions of this lease, other than the covenants for the payment 
of r 'ent, and said default shall continue for the period of thirty 
( 30) days, after notice by Lessor to Lessee, or if default be 
made in the payment of rent, when the same is due and pay-
able, and said default in the paym~nt of rent shall continue 
for a period of thirty (30) days, no notice of default in 
the payment of rent being necessary, Lessor may sell, at pub-
lic or private sale, with or without notice, any or all of the 
stock or securities .... Upon the expiration of .. . this 
lease, provided Lessee be not in default at said time, or upon 
its earlier termination by the mutual consent of Lessor and 
Lessee, the 'deposit' shall be delivered by Lessor to Lessee 
and all rights of Lessor in and to said deposit shall thereupon 
cease and terminate. However, should Lessee, at said expira-
tion of said stated term, the lease having not been terminll.ted 
earlier by mutual consent, be in default under any of thP 
terms, agreements, covenants and conditions of this lease, 
said 'd~posit' shall continue to be held by Lessor until all 
such defaults of Lessee are cured, Lessor having during said 
period of default all of its original rights therein, as if the 
term of this lease had not expired. . . . '' 
"NINTH: It is expressly covenanted and agreed by and 
between the parties hereto that in case at any time default 
shall be made by the Lessee in the payment of any rent herein 
provided for upon the day when the same shall become due 
or payable, and such default shall continue for ten (10) days, 
or in case default shall be made by the Lessee in the perform-
ance of any of the other terms, conditions or covenants of 
said lease by said Lessee to be performed, other than the 
covenant for the payment of rent, and said default shall con-
tinue for a period of thirty (30) days after the service of 
written notice of such default by the Lessor on the Lessee 
(no notice of default in the payment of rent being necessary), 
. . . then and in any of such cases, the Lessor may enter into 
and upon the demised premises or any part thereof and re-
possess the same, with or uJithout terminating this lease, a;nd 
tm:thmd prejudice to any of its remedies for rent or breach of 
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covenant, and in any such event may, at its option, terminate 
said lease by giving written notice of its election so to do, 
or may, at its option, let the premises or any part thereof 
as the agent of the Lessee, or otherwise . ... The foregoing 
rights and remedies hereinabove given to the Lessor are, and 
shall be deemed to be, cumulative, and the exercise of one 
shall not be deemed to be an election, excluding the exercise 
by the Lessor at any other or different time of a different or 
inconsistent remedy, and shall be deemed to be given to said 
Lessor in addition to any other and further rights given or 
granted to said Lessor by the terms of paragraph 'THIRD' 
herein, or by law, and the failure upon the part of the Lessor 
at any time to exercise any right or remedy hereby given to 
it shall not be deemed to operate as a waiver by it of its right 
to exercise such right or remedy at any other or future time." 
Beginning in 1948, and after defendant had entered into 
the second lease covering the Main Street lot, when the Spring 
Street lot was filled with cars, defendant would move the 
"overflow" cars from Spring Street across the alley to the 
Main Street lot. He kept records of the number of cars 
so moved, but kept no records as to how much rental he re-
ceived per car. For example, he could not tell whether he 
had received 25 cents, 50 cents or $1.00 or more for each of 
the cars moved. In accounting to the plaintiff-lessor, he al-
lowed 25 per cent of the gross reGeipts on overflow cars 
parked on the Main Street lot. At about this time, he oper-
ated both lots at night with an attendant stationed on the Main 
Street lot. This attendant serviced cars entering on the Spring 
Street lot but issued Main Street parking tickets to them. 
During 1948, and until July, 1949, no records were kept of 
gross receipts for night parking on the Spring Street lot, al-
though defendant allocated a portion of the Main Street night 
gross receipts to the Spring Street lot. Defendant continued 
to use the Spring Street lot as a feeder and driveway for the 
Main Street lot up until the time plaintiff discovered that 
method of operation and told him to desist. On July 27th, 
subsequent to notice given by plaintiff, defendant started to 
keep a record of night receipts derived from cars entering 
and parked on the Spring Street lot. 
Prior to_ the commencement of this action, defendant sub-
mitted annual reports or statements as required by the lease, 
although they were not certified, and the reports he did fur-
nish were, with one exception, not furnished within the 60-
day period from the close of the calendar year as required by 
Oct.1952] LAWRENCE BARKER, INC. v. BRIGGS 
[39 C.2d 654; 246 P.2d 897] 
659 
the lease. Plaintiff, prior to 1949, made no objection to the 
belated and inadequate reports. 'l'he 1949 report was sub-
mitted within the time provided for in the lease agreement. 
Plaintiff, on July 22, 1949, served on defendant written 
notice of default in whic.P. it claimed the right to repossess 
the premises without terminating the lease and without preju-
uice to any other rights provided for in the lease. Defendant 
claimed that he was not in default under the terms of the 
lease and refused to surrender possession. Plaintiff then 
brought this action for recovery of possession of the premises, 
defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach, by the 
plaintiff, of a covenant in the lease pertaining to a party wall. 
Defendant also filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory 
relief, alleging that the terms and provisions of the lease were 
uncertain and ambiguous, and seeking an adjudication of the 
respective parties' rights thereunder. 
In the cross-complaint it was alleged that defendant had 
paid the minimum rent up until, and including, June 1, 
1949; that commencing July 1, 1949, he has tendered to 
plaintiff the minimum rent per month plus the sum of 
$3,707.50 which represented additional rent for the calendar 
year of 1949 ''in accordance with paragraph Second of said 
lease" but that plaintiff has refused to accept such tender; 
that the money is now on deposit in a special bank account. 
It is also alleged that an actual controversy exists between 
the parties as to the interpretation of the lease in that de-
fendant claims that he is entitled to allocate gross income or 
receipts to the parking lot actually used to park the particu-
lar car, whereas plaintiff claims that, under the lease, if the 
cars enter the Spring Street lot but are parked in the Main 
Street lot, the receipts for those cars should be credited to 
the Spring Street lot. Defendant further alleges that his 
''method of allocating gross income or receipts as between 
the demised premises and other parking lots operated as a 
unit with the demise~ premises constitutes a fair and rea-
sonable method of allocation and that cross-defendant re-
ceived its just, fair and proportional share of the gross income 
or receipts attributable to the use or occupancy of the dl;lmised 
premises.'' Defendant alleges that plaintiff had waived strict 
compliance with the terms of the lease pertaining to state-
ments or reports. The trial court was requested, if any money 
was found due and owing to plaintiff, to give defendant a rea-
sonable opportunity to pay the same, to relieve him from de-
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fault and from any cancellation or the forfeiture of any of 
his rights. 
The minimum rental of $1,250 per month was the only rent 
paid by defendant and is not an issue in this case. Per-
centage rental for the calendar years 1945, 1946 and 1947 is 
not in issue. The dispute centers around the percentage 
rental for the calendar years 1948 and 1949. 
Defendant's C01tnterclaim 
Defendant's counterclaim was based on paragraph twelfth 
of the lease which reads as follows: "The demised premises 
as accepted by Lessee are subject to a party wall agreement 
with respect to the southern wall of the building adjoining 
the demised premises on the north. Pursuant to the terms of 
said agreement, Lessor has certain maintenance · obligations 
with respect to said party wall. Lessor shall not be relieved of 
its said maintenance obligations with respect to said party 
wall and said obligations are not assumed by Lessee, except 
that should Lessee in some manner avail himself of the rights 
of Lessor in and to said party wall, and use said party wall 
in connection with said Lessee's use and occupation of the 
demised premises, then and in such event, Lessee shall be 
deemed to have assumed and thereafter shall perform all 
obligations of Lessor with respect to the maintenance of said 
party wall.''' 
Defendant alleged that during the period from approxi-
mately August 15, 1946, until October 15, \946, through the 
negligence and carelessness of the plaintiff he was deprived 
· of the use of the premises by reason of the party wall becom-
ing a hazard to anyone using the premises, as a result of 
which the wall was condemned by the Building and · Safety 
Department of the City of Los Angeles. It was alleged that 
be bad not availed himself of the rights of the lessor in and 
to the party wall and that he had not used it in connection 
with the use of the premises. He prayed for damages in the 
sum of $3,731.20. Plaintiff objeeted to the introduction of 
evidence under the counterclaim on the ground that it was 
barred by section 339, subdivision 1 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure (liability not founded upon a writing) and that the 
counterclaim did not tend to diminish or defeat plaintiff's 
recovery. Defendant thereupon made an offer of proof to 
show that the city of Los Angeles bad, on or about August 
25, 1946, served defendant with a written notice which re-
quired him to immediately vacate and give up the use and 
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occupancy of the auto parking lot because of the dangerous 
condition of the premises and that as a result of this notice 
he was compelled to shut down the parking lot to his damage 
in the sum of $3,731.20. [1] It is defendant's contention 
that the applicable statute of limitation is found in section 
337 of the Code of Civil Procedure (action founded upon a 
written instrument) and that the counterclaim was :filed on 
October 3, 1949, less than four years from the_ date of the 
alleged breach by plaintiff of the provision contained in the 
lease. This would appear to be the correct statute of limi-
tation. In Tagus Ranch Co. v. Hughes, 64 Cal.App.2d 128 
[148 P.2d 79], the court held that all obligations and prom-
ises which the words of the writing necessarily import must 
be regarded as included in the terms of the writing, under 
section 337, Code of Civil Procedure. The cause of action 
here for damages did not arise until plaintiff breached the 
terms and provisions of the contract. 
Aside from the merits of the counterclaim, whether or not 
defendant may counterclaim depends on the type· of plaintiff's 
action and· whether or not it will "tend to diminish or 
defeat the plaintiff's recovery" (Code Civ. Proc., § 438). 
[2] Plaintiff maintains that its action is not one of eject-
ment, but that it was brought under section 793 of the Civil 
Code which reads as follows: "An action for the possession 
of real property leased or granted, with a right of re-entry, 
may be maintained at any time, after the right to re-enter 
has accrued, without the notice prescribed in section seven 
hundred and ninety-one." (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1159 et 
seq.) Inasmuch as plaintiff did not comply with the statutory 
notice requirements for unlawful detainer, it would appear 
that this is not such an action. 
[3] If the action is one in ejectment as it appears to be 
and which is proper in such a situation (Raffinella v. Raffinella, 
191 Cal. 753 [218 P. 397]; B. &; B. Sulphur Ca. v. Kelley, 61 
Cal.App.2d 3 [141 P.2d 908]), then the question arises 
whether the defendant's claim will tend to diminish or de-
feat plaintiff's recovery. Plaintiff seeks no money damages 
other than attorney's fees, as provided for in the lease, but 
such fees would seem to be a sufficient prayer for damages to 
entitle defendant to counterclaim for damages suffered by 
him because of plaintiff's alleged breach of the twelfth para-
graph of the lease which pertains to maintenance of the party 
wall. 
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Defendant's Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
The defendant contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying declaratory relief under the cross-com-
plaint. The trial court found that in view of the findings 
made, there was no occasion to enter any declaratory judg-
ment; that plaintiff was entitled to be placed in immediate 
possession of the leased premises but made no finding as to 
whether or not plaintiff was entitled to repossession of the 
premises without terminating the lease. More specifically 
the trial court found that the reports furnished to plaintiff, 
with one exception, although prepared and signed by a mem-
ber of a firm of certified public accountants, were not certi-
fied and were not furnished within the 60-day period and 
that they did not correctly reflect the gross income attribut-
able to the use and occupation of the leased premises. It was 
also found that the gross revenue attributable to the leased 
premises for the year 1949 should have been $35,485.60 in-
stead of $31,179.17, as reported by defendant; that the sum 
of $3,707.50 tendered by defendant to, and refused by, plain-
tiff, should have been the sum of $6,291.36. It was further 
found that plaintiff had not waived "these defaults" and 
had not led the defendant to believe that strict compliance 
with· the terms of the lease would be waived in the future. 
Other than the specific references made, and the use of the 
words "these defaults," the trial court made no attempt to 
construe the lease. No finding was made as to whether plain-
tiff's interpretation of the terms of the lease is the correct one, 
and although it may be inferred that defendant was in default 
because of his interpretation of the lease, no .finding is made 
thereon. The findings as to the incorrect gross receipts report 
could, moreover, refer either to the overflow and night park-
ing receipts or to the gross receipts on cars actually parked 
on the Spring Street lot. 
The percentage rental plaintiff was to receive over and 
above the minimum monthly rental was to be the amount by 
which 60 per cent of the gross receipts exceeded the sum of 
$15,000, and was to be based on gross income "derived in any 
manner, directly or indirectly, from or by the use or occupancy 
of said demised premis'es." No finding other than by impli-
cation from the judgment was made as to whether this provi-
sion of the lease applied to the manner in which defendant 
operated the two lots (parking cars entering Spring Street in 
the Main Street lot) so as to entitle plaintiff to the revenue 
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received in thus placing defendant in default for failing to 
account therefore other than on a percentage basis. 
In Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200 [15 N.E.2d 
576, 118 A.L.R. 789] , the court said: ''The two words (directly 
or indirectly) must have been used with some definite intent 
and purpose; otherwise why were they used at all? Aid fur-
nished 'directly' would be that furnished in a direct line, both 
literally and figuratively, to the school itself, unmistakably ear-
marked, and without circumlocution or ambiguity. Aid fur-
nished 'indirectly' clearly embraces any contribution, to 
whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or 
otherwise not in a straight, open and direct course for the open 
and avowed aid of the school, that may be to the benefit of 
the institution or promotional of its interests and purposes. 
How could the people have expressed their purpose in the 
fundamental law in more apt, simple and all-embracing lan-
guage?" (See, also, Nelson v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 255 [36 N.W. 
868]; Kirkpatrick v. State, 177 Ark. 1124 [9 S.W.2d 574].) 
In Goodman v. Global Industries, 80 Cal.App.2d 583, 587 [182 
P.2d 300], the court, in construing section 342 of the Civil 
Code had this to say concerning the legislative use of the 
words ''directly or indirectly'' : ''The words 'directly or in-
directly' indicate the intention to comprehend and include all 
types of repurchases however devised, and when the section 
is read in its entirety it is clear . . . that it was designed to 
prohibit any purchase by a corporation of its own shares 
except under conditions prescribed within the section's own 
four corners." 
[4] The words "directly or indirectly" and "from or by 
the use or occupancy" of the premises could be construed 
in accordance with plaintiff's theory or, as defendant contends 
that they should be construed, namely, that he, defendant, was 
to account to plaintiff for only a percentage of the revenue 
received for cars entering the Spring Street lot but actually 
parked on the Main Street lot and for cars entering the Main 
Street lot at night and thereafter parked on the Spring Street 
lot. If, as defendant contends, plaintiff is entitled only to 
a percentage of the revenue, rather than the entire revenue, 
from cars so parked, then the determination of the amount 
of that percentage is a question for the trial court. It is clear, 
therefore, that defendant stated a cause of action for declara-
tory relief and that the trial court erred in finding that "there 
is no occasion to enter any declaratory judgment." 
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Termination of the Lease 
[5] Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain an 
action in ejectment without terminating the lease, and that he 
is entitled to relief from forfeiture. 
In Yates v. Reid, 36 Cal.2d 383 [224 P.2d 8], although the 
facts differ from the case under consideration, the lease con-
tained a provision that in the event of abandonment or vaca-
tion of the premises by the tenant, the lessor could reenter 
and take possession and might ''at his option, either terminate 
this lease and recover from the Lessee all damages caused by 
the breach hereof of the Lessee .... No re-entry of said 
property by the Lessor, as herein provided, shall be construed 
as an election on his part to terminate this lease, unless writ-
ten notice to that effect is delivered to the Lessee. . . . '' This 
court held that the ~etaking of possession by the plaintiff as 
landlord and his reletting of the premises were entirely con-
sistent with the rights of the tenants under the lease; that 
the plaintiff did no more than exercise the rights accorded to 
him; that the provision in the lease was valid and controlling 
(Burke v. Norton, 42 Cal.App. 705 [184 P. 45] ; Brown v. 
Lane, 102 Cal.App. 350 [283 P. 78]; Security Realty· Oo. v. 
Kost, 96 Cal.App. 626 [274 P. 608]). 
In Burke v. Norton, supra, 42 Cal.App. 705, again the same 
provision was involved and plaintiff-lessor brought an action 
to recover rent, attorney's fees, damages and restoration of 
the premises. There, the court, quoting from Grommes v. 
St. Paul Trust Oo., 147 Ill. 634 [35 N.E. 820, 37 Am.St.Rep. 
248], said : " 'There is nothing illegal or improper in an 
agreement that the obligation of the tenant to pay all the rent 
to the end of the term shall remain, notwithstanding there 
has been a re-entry for default ; and if the parties choose to 
make such an agreement, we see no reason why it should not 
be held valid as against both the tenant and his sureties.' We 
think this language is applicable to the case at bar. To hold 
otherwise, it seems to us, would be to place a lessee in a 
position to retain the premises Without the payment of rent, 
and to compel the lessor to rely wholly upon the financial 
responsibility of the lessee and seek his rent from month to 
month by action, or to wholly terminate the lease, either of 
which would be less advantageous to the landlord than the 
right to re-enter and, if necessary, to relet the premises, look-
ing to the lessee for only that portion of the rental reserved 
which represents the difference between what the landlord 
could obtain from any person upon such reletting and the 
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total monthly rental. We do not hesitate to say that a con-
struction which would thus permit a lessee to determine his 
own liability is, as we understand them, repugnant to the 
decisions of this state [citing many cases]. From what we 
have said, it follows that the court erred in declaring a 
forfeiture of the lease." It would follow from the above quoted 
decision that so far as the reentry and repossession of the 
premises by plaintiff was concerned, defendant suffered no 
forfeiture. 
Paragraph third of the lease heretofore quoted contains 
provisions relating to the deposit which was intended by the 
parties as security for the faithful performance of the terms, 
conditions and covenants of the lease. It was specifically pro-
vided that plai.D.tiff could hold or sell the securities so de-
posited, upon defendant's default, either during, or at the 
end of, the term of the lease. It would appear that the reten-
tion of this sum by plaintiff does not constitute a forfeiture. 
Moreover, defendant does not request that it be returned to 
him. It is difficult to see where there is any forfeiture involved 
here. 
Defendant does pray that if the court finds that any sum is 
owed by him to plaintiff he be given a reasonable time 
within which to pay it. Plaintiff does not request any dam-
ages, nor any money whatever except for attorney's fees and 
costs. The trial court did find, as heretofore set forth, that 
defendant had not tendered the correct amount to plaintiff as 
percentage rental for the calendar year 1949. It would appear 
that any finding as to the amount of percentage rental owing 
by defendant (under plaintiff's construction of the lease) 
would be pure speculation in the absence of any records as 
to the revenue collected in the daytime for cars entering the 
Spring Street lot but parked in the Main Street lot, and the 
number of cars either parked in, or which entered, the Spring 
Street lot during the nighttime parking hours. 
In the absence of any findings on material issues pre-
sented (wherein lay defendant's default, other than the 
belated and uncertified annual reports ; whether or not the 
second paragraph of the lease is to be interpreted according 
to the theory advanced by plaintiff or defendant; whether 
plaintiff has the right to possession without terminating the 
lease; whether plaintiff has the right to retain the security 
deposit) the case must be reversed. As this court said in 
Dabney v. Philleo, 38 Cal.2d 60, 69-70 [237 P.2d 648] : "It is 
apparent that there was a justiciable controversy between 
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plaintiffs and Clifford's assignees. The trial court should have 
expressly declared their rights. (Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 
34 Cal.2d 614, 624 [213 P .2d 492] .) " 
Another error warranting reversal is found in the trial 
court's refusal to allow the introduction of evidence on defend-
ant's counterclaim inasmuch as the action was not barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), 
appears to be one of ejectment, and the claim would tend to 
diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery. 
Judgment reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree that 
the trial court erred in refusing to admit any evidence relating 
to the party wall and that the cause should therefore be 
remanded for a new trial on the issues raised by the counter-
claim. On the basis of the provision in the lease that "Lessor 
shall not be relieved of its said maintenance obligations with 
respect to said party wall,'' defendant offered to prove that 
"the lessor plaintiff both expressly and impliedly agreed to 
maintain and keep in repair this party wall so far as the lessee 
is concerned, in conjunction with its contractual liability with 
the contiguous owner under a party wall agreement.'' The 
counterclaim quotes the paragraph of the lease stating the 
parties' obligations with respect to the party wall, and alleges 
that the "plaintiff herein negligently and carelessly failed to 
maintain said party wall in a safe condition.'' The words 
"negligently and carelessly" do not prevent defendant from 
proving a cause of action in contract (see L. B. Laboratories, 
Inc. v. MitchelL, ante, pp. 59, 60 [244 P.2d 385]; George 
v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 841 [205 P.2d 
1037]), and since the alleged obligation was based on the 
written lease, section 337 (1) appears to be the applicable 
statute of limitation. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
rejecting the offer of proof. 
On the other issues, I concur in the dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Edmonds. 
EDMONDS, J.-The counterclaim of Briggs does not 
charge Barker with any breach of contract to maintain a 
party wall. At most, the pleading states a cause of action in 
tort which would lie against either owner of the wall for per-
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mitting it to become a private nuisance. For that reason, 
section 337 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to 
"[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing" is not the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
The lease does not contain any obligation <Jr promise, express 
or implied, whereby Barker promises Briggs that the wall 
will be kept in repair. It states that the demised prem-
ises are subject to a party wall agreement whereby Barker 
has certain maintenance obligations. What these obligations 
are, or with whom, is not specified. Presumably they are owed 
to the other owner of the party wall. The lease further pro-
vides that Briggs is not to be liable for these obligations 
except under certain circumstances which are alleged not to 
have occurred. Barker is to remain obligated under the party 
wall agreement. The most which can be construed from this 
provision is that Briggs, as lessee, is to be protected against 
an assumption of a covenant with some third party. The only 
promise is that Briggs will not be held liable for any obliga-
tions under this separate agreement. 
The facts alleged in the counterclaim do not support a 
charge that Barker breached its obligation to Briggs to pro-
tect him from liability for the party wall agreement. There 
is no claim that the cause of action is based upon the party 
wall agreement, nor is it alleged that the agreement is in 
writing and that Briggs is a third-party beneficiary of it. 
(Of. Division of Lab. Law Enforcement v. Dennis, 81 Cal. 
App.2d 306 [183 P.2d 932].) 
Tagus Ranch Oo. v. Hughes, 64 Cal.App.2d 128 [148 P.2d 
79], is cited for the proposition "that all obligations and 
promises which the words of the writing necessarily import 
must be regarded as included in the terms of the writing, 
under section 337, Code of Civil Procedure." Although the 
statement of the rule of that case is correct, it is not here 
applicable. In the Tagus Ranch case, the instrument read: 
. ''I . . . hereby confess and acknowledge that I have stolen 
and embezzled from you" a certain sum of money. The 
uourt, quite properly, construed this to imply, as a matter of 
law, a promise to repay the sum embezzled. According to the 
court, ''The obligation to repay could be established by the 
use of these writings and there would be no need for evidence 
of facts· and occurrences outside of those appearing on the 
face of the instruments. Under these circumstances we think 
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the writings in question are sufficient to bring the action 
within the provisions of the four-year statute above men-
tioned." (P. 131.) 
In support of this conclusion, the court relied upon O'Brien 
v. Kilng, 174 Cal. 769 [164 P. 631], which stated the rule as 
follows: "A cause of action is 'founded upon an instrument 
of writing' when •the contract, obligation, or liability grows 
'out of written instruments not remotely or ultimately, but 
immediately.'" (P. 772.) The O'Brien case concerned an 
instrument reading : ''Received from Miss Hannah 0 'Brien, 
. . . $450 . . . at 5 per cent interest.'' The court said: "The 
reasonable-indeed, the only reasonable-meaning of these 
words is that the money was received as a loan at the specified 
interest rate. A loan being established by the writing, a 
promise to repay is implied by necessary inference of law 
!IDd fact. Such promise is embodied in the language of the 
writing, although not expressed in the words 'I promise to 
pay.' " (P. 773.) According to the court, "promises 'merely 
implied by law' from a situation evidenced by a writing, i.e., 
quasi contracts, are not within the statutory provision under 
discussion. The promise must be one arising directly from 
the writing itself, and included in its terms. But in deter-
mining whether the obligation is 'supported by an express 
promise or stipulation in the written instrument,' we must 
regard, as included in the terms of the writing, all obliga-
tions and promises which its words necessarily import.'' 
(P. 774.) 
In McCarthy v. Mt. Tecarte L. &; W. Oo., 111 Cal. 328 
[ 43 P. 956], the plaintiff, director of the corporation, at-
tempted to rely upon a resolution of the board of directors 
appointing him superintendent of the company. The resolu-
tion did not fix any compensation for the position, and plain-
tiff was entitled to none unless the circumstances raised an 
implied assumpsit. The court said: "But a cause of action 
is not upon a contract founded upon an instrument in writing, 
within the meaning of the code, merely because it is in some 
way remotely or indirectly connected with such an instru-
ment, or because the instrument would be a link in the chain 
of evidence establishing the cause of action. In order to be· 
founded upon an instrument in writing, the instrument must, 
itself, contain a contract to do the thing for the nonperform-
ance of which the action. is brought." (P. 340.) Therefore, 
the court concluded, the plaintiff's cause of action, not being 
based upon a written instrument, was barred by section 339 (1). 
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It summarized the situation as follows: "Appellant could not 
have been precluded from showing affirmatively that no com-
pensation was intended or expected, upon the ground that it 
would have been an attempt to contradict a written instru-
ment. If respondent have any cause of action, it is upon an 
understanding of appellant and the expectation of respondent 
that he would be compensated, which may be implied, if the 
evidence be sufficient, from all of the circumstances of the 
case, and not upon any written instrument." (P. 342.) 
In the present case, the lease provision that Barker will 
remain obligated upon the separate party wall agreement 
may be some evidence of its liability in tort for failure to 
maintain the wall. But it would not be precluded by the 
rule of integration from proving that"it is not subject to such 
liability. From all that appears, its obligations under the, 
agreement may have been no more than to paint or light the 
wall. The lease contains no promise that Barker will repair 
the wall, or so maintain it that it will not b!:!come a nuisance. 
If this is Barker's obligation, it can be proved only by evi-
dence of the agreement or other evidence outside the lease. 
The counterclaim is based upon Barker's negligence and care-
lessness in maintaining the wall, as a result of which it be-
came a hazard. Barker's liability, if any, for this condition 
does not arise "immediately" out of a written instrument. 
The lease does not contain a contract to keep the wall in repair, 
for nonperformance of which the action is brought. There-
fore, the action is barred by section 339(1) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure which requires that an action "upon a con-
tract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing" must be commenced within two years. 
As another ground for reversa,l of the judgment, it is held 
that Briggs stated a cause of action for declaratory relief 
and the trial court erred in deciding that he was not entitled 
to such a judgment. (Dabney v. Philleo, 38 Cal.2d 60, 70 (237 
P.2d 648] ; Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Ca1.2d 614, 624 
[213 P.2d 492].) However, whether, under all of the circum-
stances, a declaration of the rights of the parties is neces-
sary or proper is a matter within the discretion of the 
trial court, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of 
that discretion, which does not appear here, its decision will 
not be disturbed upon appeal. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1061; Han-
nula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 34 Cal.2d 442, 448 [211 P.2d 
302, 19 A.L.R.2d 1268] ; California Physicians' Service v. Gar-
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rison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 801 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.L.R. 306]; Moss 
v. Moss, 20 Oal.2d 640, 643-644 [128 P.2d 526, 141 A.L.R. 
1422); Cutting v. B1·yan, 206 Cal. 254,257 [274 P. 326].) 
Barker's complaint and supplemental complaint alleged that 
Briggs was in default under the second paragraph of the 
lease by failure to furnish certified statements and pay the 
additional rental of 60 per cent of the gross income or receipts 
in excess of $25,000 derived in ·any maimer, directly or indi-
rectly, from the use or occupancy of the premises. The pleader 
claimed the right, by reason of these defaults, to reenter and 
repossess the premises without terminating the lease. Accord-
ing to the supplemental complaint, the lease does not author-
ize any allocation or proration of receipts between the demised 
premises and the other parking lots not belonging to Barker. 
By amended answer to the complaint and answer to the 
.supplemental complaint, Briggs admitted his failure to file a 
certified statement within the proper time in 1948, but claimed 
that Barker had waived the provisions of the lease in this re-
spect by accepting, in prior years, unverified statements later 
than the time specified. He denied that the 1949 statement 
did not comply with the lease. Briggs also denied that he 
had failed to pay the additional rental provided in the lease 
and was in default. Therefore, he said, Barker is not entitled 
to reenter and repossess the premises without terminating the 
lease. According to Briggs, ''The dispute, if any, over the 
amount of rent owed ... arises from the manner in which 
defendant has apportioned gross receipts from the operation 
of all of defendant's parking lots to the use or occupancy of 
the demised premises. . . . Plaintiff is not entitled to receipts 
from the parking of cars on the adjoining lots not owned by 
plaintiff.'' 
As stated by Briggs in his cross.complaint, it was his custom 
to operate the demised premises and two other lots as a single 
unit from time to time and he alleged that he maintained 
records to show "the gross profits fairly attributable to the 
use and occupancy of the demised premises.'' He claimed the 
right under the lease "to allocate gross income or receipts to 
the parking lot on which a particular automobile is parked 
when overflow cars enter the demised premises but are parked 
on adjoining lots." He also pleaded that "his method of al-
locating gross income or receipts as between the demised prem-
ises and other parking lots operated as a unit with the demised 
premises constitutes a fair and reasonable method of alloca-
tion and that cross-defendant received its just, fair and pro-
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portional share of the gross income or receipts attributable to 
the use or occupancy of the demised premises.'' According to 
Briggs, unless he secures a declaration of his rights Barker 
1 1 will endeavor to terminate and cancel the rights of cross-
complainant in and to the lease. . . and will forfeit and use 
the deposit of the cross-complainant put up on said lease.'' 
The basic issues joined by the pleadings were simply whether 
Briggs was in default under the terms of the lease and, if so, 
whether Barker was entitled to repossession without terminat-
ing the lease. Insofar as the alleged default in payment of 
additional rentals is concerned, Briggs asserted that he was 
entitled to allocate receipts between the several lots. No new 
issue was raised by the cross-complaint for declaratory relief. 
''The purpose of section 1060 et seq. of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, providing for actions for declaratory reliefr is to 
provide a ready and speedy remedy in cases of actual contro-
versy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective 
parties. By section 1061 the court is permitted to refuse to 
exercise the power in any case where its declaration or deter-
mination is not necessary under the circumstances. This is 
such a case. All the issues raised in the cross-complaint can 
be readily determined in the trial of the special defenses raised 
in the answer and, because this affirmatively appears upon the 
face of the pleading, the trial court properly refused to exer-
cise the power granted by these sections of the code.'' (Welfare 
Inv. Co. v. Stowell, 132 Cal.App. 275, 278 [22 P.2d 529] ; 
Sunset Scavenger Corp. v. Odd<Ju, 11 Cal.App.2d 92, 96 [53 
P.2d 188].) 
The trial court found that in 1946 Briggs did not furnish 
a report prepared and certified as required by the lease and 
that the reports which he supplied in 1947, 1948 and 1949 
were neither certified nor presented within the time pro-
vided by the lease. With regard to these reports, it said that, 
"It is not true that these ·reports correctly reflected the gross 
income attributable to the use and occupation by the defendant 
of the leased premises.'' As a portion of this finding concern-
ing reports, the court declared,: "It is not true that the plain .. 
tiff, . . . waived these defaults, or led the defendant to believe 
that strict compliance in the future with the terms of the Lease 
would not be required.'' 
The court then found that a certified report was furnished 
within the proper time for the year 1949, but that it showed 
a gross revenue attributable to the leased premises of $35,-
485.60, rather than the sum of $31,179.17 which Briggs reported 
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to Barker. This report, the court said, did not correctly 
reflect the gross income attributable to the use of the prem-
ises. The court also found that the payment of $3,707.50 
which Briggs tendered after commencement of the action, 
should have been in the amount' of $6,291.36. From these 
findings, the court concluded that Barker was entitled to a 
judgment for immediate possession of the property and that 
Briggs was not entitled to a declaratory judgment. 
Because of asserted deficiencies in the findings, it is now 
held that the judgment must be reversed. However, even if 
we assume that the findings are insufficient, this court "may 
make findings of fact contrary to, or in addition to, those 
made by the trial court." (Code Civ. Proc. § 956a.) In 
Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 266 [280 P. 970], the 
court explained the purpose of section 956a to be that, "when-
ever possible, and the interests of justice would seem to 
require, the reviewing court should have the power to make 
new findings contrary to or in addition to those made by the 
trial court, either on the record presented or on new evidence 
to be taken under the direction of the court, all with refer-
ences to material issues framed by the pleadings, to the end 
that the judgment or order appealed from may be affirmed 
and further litigation terminated." The constitutional and 
statutory provisions which empower this court to affirm, 
modify or direct the entry of a final judgment are to be 
liberally construed toward the end that a cause may be dis-
posed of on a single appeal. (Cal. Canst., art. VI, § 4% ; Code 
Civ. Proc. §§53, 956a; American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van 
Winkle, ante, pp. 210, 219 [246 P.2d 935] ; T1tpman v. Haber-
kern, supra; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 547 [134 P.2d 
217] ; Culjak v. Better Built Hames, 58 Cal..A.pp.2d 720, 725 
[137 P.2d 492] .) 
Where the error in an action for declaratory relief consists 
of entering a judgment of dismissal rather than decreeing 
expressly that the complainant is not entitled to declarations 
in his favor (as is implied by the judgment of dismissal), the 
· court may modify the judgment by inserting an express dec-
laration of the rights of the parties. (Essick v. City of Los 
Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 624-625 [213 P.2d 492] .) In the 
Essick case the judgment was affirmed, as modified, although 
the trial court erroneously failed to declare the rights of the 
parties. Because the evidence contained in the record was 
sufficient to empower the court to modify the judgment, the 
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error in entering a judgment of dismissal was not prejudicial. 
Under the circumstances, no reversal was rt!quired. 
The present decision implicitly approves the trial court's 
findings, as far as they go, with the exception of the specifica-
tion of the amount of additional rental which Briggs should 
have paid, a determination which is unnecessary to the judg-
ment. These findings are sufficient to sustain the judgment 
restoring Barker to possession and allowing attorney's fees 
and costs. Even if additional findings were necessary, the 
record would enable this court to supply them and modify the 
judgment. No extrinsic evidence has been offered to aid in 
the interpretation of the terms of the lease, nor is it contended 
that any such evidence is required. The document is in evi-
dence and may as readily be interpreted by this court as by 
the trial court. 
The majority have gone halfway in supplying the :findings 
which they say are missing by determining that, if Briggs has 
breached the terms of the lease, Barker is entitled to possession 
without terminating the lease and may retain the security 
deposit in accordance with its terms. This conclusion is based 
upon the correct interpretation of the lease provisions. How-
ever, no issue was raised by the cross-complaint concerning 
either of these points and there was no necessity to grant 
declaratory relief for the sole purpose of deciding them. 
"As to the principles governing appellate courts in con-
sidering the adequacy of findings to dispose of issues and sup-
port a judgment it is a general rule that 'Even though a find-
ing might have been more clearly phrased, it is sufficient if 
its language is clear enough to indicate what the court in-
tended; and if there are findings sufficient to support ·the 
judgment, they are not vitiated by the unintelligibility of 
others. Any uncertainty in the findings will be construed so 
as to support the judgment rather than to defeat it.' . . . It 
is also to b!l noted that while full findings are required upon 
all material issues a judgment will not be set aside on appeal 
because of a failure to make an express finding upon an issue 
if a finding thereon, consistent with the judgment, results by 
necessary implication from the express findings which are 
made." (Richter v. Walker, 36 Ca.l.2d 634, 639-640 [226 P.2d 
593) .) 
Also, "[i]t is well settled, in spite of the fact that section 
633 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that facts and 
conclusions must be separately stated, that a finding may be 
18 C.2d-22 
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regarded as one of fact, although mistakenly placed among 
the conclusions of law." (Linberg v. Stanto, 211 Cal. 771, 
776 [297 P. 9, 75 A.L.R. 555] .) "It is also the. rule that find-
ings are sufficient if they can be made certain by reference to 
the record" (Ethel D. Co. v. Industria,l Ace. Com., 219 Cal. 
699, 708 [28 P.2d 919]) or the pleadings. (Kennedy~ Shaw 
Lbr. Co. v. S. S. Const. Co., 123 Cal. 584,585-586 [56 P. 457].) 
Although the findings in this case are far from ideal, and 
should have been drawn with more certainty, the weakD.ess in 
them is not fatally defective. (Richter v. Walker, supra.) 
Upon the ultimate fact of whether Briggs was in default under 
the provisions of the lease, the court found that he did not 
report the proper gross receipts attributable to the use and 
occupation of the leased premises. From a review of the 
record, it is obvious that the finding also was intended to 
encompass a failure to pay the correct amount of additional 
rental. 
The majority object to the findings of an inoorrect report of 
gross receipts upon the ground that they could ''refer either 
to the overflow and night parking receipts or to the gross re-
ceipts on cars actually parked on the Spring Street lot.'' 
However, "[t]he court's -finding was upon the ultimate fact 
in issue and was therefore sufficient." (Estate of Janes, 
18 Cal.2d 512, 514 (116 P.2d 438].) It was not necessary for 
the court also to find upon the probative facts from which it 
deduced the ultimate fact of failure to comply with the pro-
visions of the lease. (Klein v. Milne, 198 Cal. 71, 75 [243 P. 
420].) 
Ample support for the finding that Briggs failed properly 
to account for gross receipts is provided by the undisputed 
evidence that, for more than a year, no records were kept of 
gross receipts for night parking. This breach of the lease 
is sufficient of itself to give Barker the right to possession. 
In addition, there is some indication in the record that the 
trial court intended to construe the lease contrary to Briggs' 
claim of a right to allocate receipts to various lots. However, 
the finding being supported by other sufficient evidence, it is 
unnecessary for this court to consider that question of in-
terpretation. "It is, of course, immaterial that the theory 
upon which the judgment may be affirmed is not identical 
with that relied upon by plaintiffs or by the trial court, since 
plaintiffs are required only to plead and prove facts sufficient 
to justify relief, and the trial court's judgment must be af-
firmed if the findings, supported by the evidence, are sufficient 
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to warrant the relief granted on any legal theory." (Sears v. 
Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 140-141 [163 P.2d 443] .) 
Among the findings of fact there is none directed specifically 
to the question of whether Barker has the right to possession 
without terminating the lease. However, there is a so-called 
conclusion of law providing: 1 1 That plaintiff is entitled . . . 
to be placed in the immediate possession of said real prop-
erty." This is, in effect, a finding upon an ultimate fact in 
issue, and may be treated as such. (liinberg v. Stanto, supra.) 
Even if it were not to be considered as a finding of fact, a 
determination that Barker is entitled to immediate possession 
of the property results by necessary implication from the ex-
press finding that Briggs is in default under the lease. It 
is obvious from the lease, as construed by the majority, that, 
if Briggs is in default, Barker is entitled to possession with-
out terminating the lease. The finding must be interpreted 
to include the right to continue the obligations of the lease. 
The only issue raised by the pleadings was whether the lease 
had been breached so that Barker had the right to possession 
without terminating it. There was no issue as to whether 
he had the right to possession, but not the right to continue 
the lease in effect. 
Construing the findings so as to support the judgment 
rather than defeat it (Richter v. Walker, supra,) I conclude 
that they are sufficient to determine the cause without the 
necessity of making additional findings. Those which were 
made, supported by sufficient evidence, eliminated any neces-
sity for determining whether Briggs' interpretation of the 
lease in regard to allocation of rentals was correct. The court 
having found that Briggs was no longer entitled to possession 
of the property, his interpretation of the additional rental 
provision became an immaterial issue and the failure to find 
thereon does not constitute prejudicial error. (Merrill v. 
Gordon & Harrison, 208 Cal. 1, 6 r279 P. 996]; Woodhead v. 
W 1,'lkinson, 181 Cal. 599, 602 [185 P . 851, 10 A.L.R. 291] .) 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgme;nt. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
3, 1952. Edmonds, J ., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
